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The dramatic transformations experienced by Russia in the 1990s were accompanied by
the radical changes in views of the past. Whereas social class struggle was emphasized
by the Soviet Marxist historiography, ethnicity became the focal point of the post-Soviet
one. This replacement was especially sensitive for historical education at school where an
image of the class enemy was forced out by that of ethnic enemy. It is in this context that
an ideology of national-liberation movement was replaced by an idea of the clash of
cultural values as a universal explanation of wars and ethnic conﬂicts.
This new paradigm is analyzed with reference to images of the North Caucasian high-
landers in the post-Soviet history textbooks, especially with respect to their participation
in the Caucasian war in the early 19th century and their deportation in 1943–1944. I will
also discuss how the new North Ossetian and Ingush history textbooks represent ethnic
neighbors – the Ingush by the Ossetians and the Ossetians by the Ingush. I will argue that
cultural fundamentalism and ethnocentrism, which make up the basis of the post-Soviet
historiography, cultivate soil for cultural racism – the most powerful type of racism in the
contemporary world.
Copyright  2011, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.In the 1990s the Northern Caucasus turned into the region
of continuous ethnic tensions and conﬂicts. The bloody
Ossetian–Ingush clash of the very late October–early
November 1992 was followed by ethnic cleansing, and the
Prigorodnydistrictof theRepublicofNorthernOssetiahas lost
its Ingush inhabitants for years. And two years later the Che-
chenwarhasbrokenoutwhich turned theNorthernCaucasus
into a center of political instability and terrorism. The Osse-
tian–Ingushconﬂicthadaterritorialandpoliticalbackground:
to overcome the deportation trauma the Ingush claimed-PaciﬁcResearchCenter,Hanya restoration of their autonomy which they enjoyed before
1934. They were planning to get back the Prigorodny district
granted to the Republic of Northern Ossetia in 1944 after the
Chechen–Ingush Autonomous Republic has been dissolved.
The Chechen war was caused by the new Chechen leaders’
ambition to reach a political sovereignty aswell as a stubborn
unwillingness of the Russian authorities to search for political
compromisethroughpeacefulnegotiations.A sharpgrowthof
Chechenophobia was one of ugly results of the Chechen war
which was intensively stirred up by mass media. The anti-
Caucasian attitudes grew up as well in the 1990s.
In this paper, my ambition is to study the role of history
textbooks in development of ethnic prejudice, suspicions
and hatred. It should be fairly clear that a school textbook is
unable to provide with a complete and unbiased view of
state or regional history. Firstly, this is impossible with
respect to its restricted volume as well as limited timeangUniversity.ProducedanddistributedbyElsevierLimited.All rights reserved.
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a highly dynamic phenomenon: it is permanently enriched
with new data and new approaches paving a path to new
interpretations of already known facts or to re-evaluation of
the past events. Thirdly, a conceptual shift and a radical
replacement of analytical language might cause a revision
up to a complete rejection of the former historical scheme.
The reasons for such radical changes are usually beyond
professional activity of the historians. As a rule, they are
introduced by crucial political transformations or by new
philosophical views which highly affect social perception of
the reality. Finally, an objective of the historical education in
public school is a socialization of loyal citizens rather than
a training of future professional historians. In order to meet
this demand the historical facts are selected, put into
a particular order and interpreted. As a result, a textbook in
history reﬂects the current social attitudes embedded into
its author’s political viewsorhis/her understandingof social
and political demands. A textbook as well as a more general
view of national history is based on the key facts or events
which provide it with heroic and/or tragic appearance.
Therefore, an analysis of the representation of these mile-
stones in the educational materials and ﬁctions might
improve our understanding of social attitudes and identity
of any given society in any particular time.
In the late 1990s, the public school curriculum in Russia
was enriched with a civilizational approach, which
provided culture with high durability and indoctrinated
students with a belief in its consistency and resistance to
any radical changes through centuries – hence an obsolete
idea of national character came back to a public discourse.
It is here that onemight reveal a fertile grounds for the idea
of “cultural incompatibility,” which was put forward by the
Western New Right in the 1970s. Nowadays, this idea is
invariably treated by specialists as an obvious manifesta-
tion of the new, or cultural (differential), racism.1 In the
past, the cultural racismwas permanently a follow-traveler
of the biological racism. Yet, whereas it was perceived
formerly as something less important and derivative,
nowadays it proves to be an autonomous self-sustained
ideology. It reveals itself in political rhetoric, mass media
and ﬁction, and is aimed against “aliens”, “strangers” and
“migrants” who are treated as some evil agents capable to
spoil and corrupt the dominant majority’s culture.2
There are good reasons to believe that contemporary
school is a favorite milieu for cultural racism. Whereas social
classstrugglewasemphasizedbytheSoviet school asaprime-1 For cultural racism see, Barker M. The new racism. Conservatives and
the ideology of the tribe. Frederick, Maryland: Aletheia books, 1981;
Taguieff P.-A. The new cultural racism in France//Telos, spring 1990, no. 83;
idem. From race to culture: the New Right’s view of European identity//
Telos, winter 1993–spring 1994, no. 98–99; idem. Sur la Nouvelle Droite.
Paris: Descartes & Cie, 1994; Shnirelman V. A. Etnichnost’, tsivilizatsionnyi
podkhod, “pravo na samobytnost” i “novyi rasizm”//Dadiani L. Ya., Deni-
sovskii G. M. (eds.). Sotsial’noe soglasie protov pravogo extremizma. Vyp.
3–4. pp. 216–244. Moscow: Institute of Sociology, 2005; idem. Rasizm:
vchera i segodnia//Pro et Contra. 2005. Tome 9, no 2. pp. 41–65.
2 For that see, Van Dijk T. Elite discourse and racism. Newbury Park:
Sage, 1993; Osipov A. G. Konstruirovanie etnicheskogo konﬂikta i rasist-
skii diskurs//Voronkov V., Karpenko O., Osipov A. (eds.). Rasizm v yazyke
sotsyal’nykh nauk. St.-Petersburg: Aleteia, 2002.mover of social evolution, this paradigm was replaced in the
post-Soviet Russia by the priority of ethnic and civilizational
values.3 This is not to say that textbooks in history are inten-
tionally aimed at ethnic confrontation or “clash of civiliza-
tions.” Yet, whilemaking an emphasis on the allegedly highly
persistent and less dynamic civilizations and ethnic cultures,
the textbooks’ authors consciously or unconsciously imposed
“tribal instincts” upon students as a result of a reference to
sharp opposition between “titled nation”/“native people”, on
the one hand, and “non-titled people”/“non-natives”, on the
other hand. Thus, individual human rights are forced out to
the marginal zone or subordinated to some ethnic collective
rights and obligations. At the same time every ethnic group is
represented as a cohesive wholeness (“collective body”) with
well-established boundaries, which encircle original genuine
culturesasthoughtheyhave incommonwitheachother. Such
one-dimensional view of cultural pattern evidently distorts
a reality represented by cultural intercommunications and
intercourse,hybridizationandbiculturalism. Instead, it fosters
anoutlookbasedon the ideaof an inevitable strugglebetween
cultures or civilizations, which is enforced by such terms as
“archetypes”, “national character”, “ecology of culture”, “civ-
ilizational values”, and the like. Unfortunately, it is this rhet-
oric which is often explicitly or implicitly used in the
contemporary Russian textbooks.
With all this in mind, it is worth analyzing how the
Chechen wars of the 1990s–early 2000s and the Ossetian–
Ingush conﬂict affected a representation of the focal points
of the North Caucasian history both in the federal and
regional textbooks in history.1. The Chechen trace
The recent inﬂuential federal textbook in the Russia’s
history of the 17th–19th centuries intended for public high
school emphasizes two main reasons for the Caucasianwar
of the early 19th century. Firstly, the highlanders were
traditionally highly bellicose and used to practice plun-
dering raids, and secondly, they adopted Islam in its radical
form (Muridism), which ruled out any negotiations with
them. The highlanders are depicted respectively in quite
negative terms: they are provided with allegedly inborn
“militant spirit”, they “cruelly tortured inﬁdels”, and the
Shamil’s Imamat was based on “cruel rules.”4 At the same3 Guzenkova T. S. Etnonatsional’nye problemy v uchebnikakh po
istorii//Eimermaher A., Bordiugov G. (eds.). Natsional’nye istorii v sovet-
skom i postsovetskikh gosudarstvakh. Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1999. pp. 120–
123, 139; Malakhov V. Preodolimo li etnotsentrichnoe myshlenie?//Vor-
onkov V., Karpenko O., Osipov A. (eds.). Rasizm v yazyke sotsyal’nykh
nauk. St.-Petersburg: Aleteia, 2002. p. 18.
4 Sakharov A. N., Bokhanov A. N. Istoriia Rossii. XVII–XIX veka. Uchebik
dlia 10 klassa obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchebnykh zavedenii. Moscow:
Russkoe slovo, 2003. pp. 319–324. One can ﬁnd the same attitude in the
monarchist textbooks published separately by one of those authors and
intended for secondary school. See, Bokhanov A. N. Istoriia Rossii. XIX –
nachalo XX v. Uchebik dlia 8–9 klassov. Moscow: Russkoe slovo, 1998. pp.
105–107; idem. Istoriia Rossii XIX vv. Uchebik dlia 8 klassa srednikh
obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchebnykh zavedenii. Moscow: Russkoe slovo,
2003. pp. 89–92. On the Chechenophobia in those textbooks see, Ushakov
A. Obraz vraga v uchebnoi literature//Eimermaher A., Bordiugov G. (eds.).
Istoriki chitaiut uchebniki istorii. Moscow: AIRO-XX, 2002. pp. 64–65.
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earth implemented by the commander-in-chief general A.
P. Yermolov,5 and of the brutal actions of other tsarist
generals who exterminated the whole indigenous village-
communities.6 A student would be also uninformed of the
plans, being worked out under the emperor Aleksander I, to
push the highlanders away from the Caucasus.7 Also no
textbook discusses the forced resettlement of tens of
thousands of indigenous inhabitants to Ottoman Empire in
1859–1865. Instead, a student will be taught that Russia
could not tolerate disobedience of the Muslim rebels
(murids) and had to use force.
Thus, a failure to mention certain important facts and an
obviously reductionist discussion of other facts lead to
a demonization of the highlanders, whereas the policy
of the Russian authorities is represented as a “forced
response.” In this paradigm, it is the highlanders who are
accused for the Caucasianwar according to the well-known
principle “to blame the victim.” This approach was devel-
oped by the Ossetian historian Mark M. Bliev who, as his
colleague has recognized, denied any “anti-colonial” char-
acter of the Shamil movement, and, as a result, the high-
landers turned to be the aggressors, and Russia just
defended itself.8
To be sure, several various sets of textbooks in Russian
history are used in contemporary schools, and teachers5 It is worth noting that many North Caucasian authors still treat him
but as the bloody enemy of their own people. For example see, Akhmadov
S.B., Bagaev M.K., and Yereshchenko G.A. Rasskazy po istorii rodnogo
kraia. Uchebnoe posobie dlia uchashchikhsia 6 klassa. Grozny: Kniga,
1991. p. 36 ff.; Kerashev A.T. and Chirg A.Yu. Istoriia Adygei. Uchebnoe
posobie dlia uchitelei istorii 8–9 klassov. Maikop: Adygeiskoe knizhnoe
izdatel’stvo, 1994. p. 136 ff.; Begidov A. M. Kabardino-Balkaria: proshloe,
nastoiashchee, budushchee. Moscow: Novyi khronograf, 2003. p. 31;
Gapurov Sh. A., Zakriev B. B. Deportatsiia chechentsev v 1818–1819
godakh//Ubushaev V. B. (ed.). Natsional’naia politika sovetskogo gosu-
darstva: repressii protiv narodov i problemy ikh vozrozhdeniia. Elista:
Kalmytskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2003. pp. 21–24; Akhmadov Ya.,
Khismagomedov E. Istoriia Chechni v XIX–XX vekakh. Moscow: Pul’s,
2005. pp. 97–98, 102–103.
6 For that see, Ratushniak V. N. (ed.). Ocherki istorii Kubani s drev-
neishikh vremendo 1920 goda. Krasnodar: Sovetskaia Kuban’,1996. p. 255;
Nakhushev V. S. (ed.). Narody Karachaevo-Cherkesii: istoriia i kul’tura.
Cherkessk: KChRIPKRO, 1998. p. 451; Bliev M. M. and Bzarov R. S. Istoriia
Osetii s drevneishikh vremen do kontsa 19 v. Vladikavkaz: Ir, 2000. (2nd
edition.Noscow: Ventana-Graf, 2005). p. 269, 275–276, 281–282.
7 Kokorkhoeva D. S. Natsional’naia politika sovetskogo gosudarstva v
30–40-kh gg. XX v.: deportatsiia narodov i likvidatsiia ikh gosu-
darstvennosti//Ubushaev V. B. (ed.). Natsional’naia politika sovetskogo
gosudarstva: repressii protiv narodov i problemy ikh vozrozhdeniia. Eli-
sta: Kalmytskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2003. p. 104.
8 Degoev V. V. Kavkazskaia voina XIX v. i ideologicheskie kon’iunktury
sovetskogo i postsovetskogo vremeni//Rossiia XXI, 1997, no. 11–12. pp.
41–42; idem. Problema Kavkazskoi voiny XIX veka: istoriograﬁcheskie
itogi//Sbornik Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, 2000, t. 2 (150). p.
239. Bliev seems to make an attempt to radically revise this concept in his
textbook in history of Ossetia. There he accused the tsarist government
for an attempt to blame highlanders for the Caucasian war with a refer-
ence to their love for plundering raids and predatory behavior. He treated
those accusations as indiscriminate ones. See, Bliev M. M. and Bzarov R. S.
Op. cit. p. 274. Yet, in his most recent book he reproduced his favorite
concept once again. See, Bliev M. M. Rossiia i gortsy Bol’shogo Kavkaza na
puti k tsivilizatsii. Moscow: Mysl’, 2004. For the Bliev’s concept in details
see, Shnirelman V. A. Byt’ alanami: Intellektualy i politika na Severnom
Kavkaze v XX v. Moscow: NLO, 2006. pp. 161–168.are, by no means, forced to select the one mentioned
above. Therefore, it is worth analyzing how the Caucasian
war is represented in some other textbooks.
Only a few textbooks including that of N. A. Troitsky
intended for secondary school, depict this war as an
aggressive expansion of the Russian Empire, and the
highlanders – as ﬁghters for independence. Nothing is said
there of the plundering raids.9 It is in this way that the
Caucasian war is represented as a military–political
conﬂict, a result of the tsarist colonial expansion rather
than any ethnic conﬂict. Yet, it seems that this approach is
less popular in the contemporary Russian school.
For example, popular P. N. Zyrianov’s textbooks, which
are treated by the experts as a good case of the liberal
approach,10 develop their arguments along the same line as
the conservative Bokhanov’s ones. With respect to the
causes of the Caucasian war Zyrianov claims: “It is the
highlanders’ princes who were mainly guilty with its
unleashing, yet they brought about misfortunes and
sufferings to common highlanders and peaceful Russian
peasants most of all.”11 While following Bliev’s strategy, he
also emphasizes the highlanders’ plundering raids and fails
to discuss the tsarist colonial policy as well as cruel prac-
tices of the tsarist generals. One can ﬁnd the same approach
in the popular textbook “Russia and the world” where the
conﬂict is represented in the following way: “The Russian
policy has got into a clash with the interests of the [plun-
dering] raids’ organizers and participants,” and “indepen-
dent highlanders’ tribes that were always ready for armed
attacks endangered the Russian rule in the Caucasus.”12 The
M. N. Zuev’s textbook goes even further as, being obviously
affected by the contemporary political development in the
Northern Caucasus, the author teaches students: “A joining
of the Caucasus to Russia which has been completed in the
1820s gave birth to a separatist movement of the Muslim
highlanders of Chechnya, Highland Dagestan and North-
Western Caucasus.” Beside an ascription of “separatism” to
the region, which still has not been integrated by Russia
ﬁnally, the author revives the myth of the late Stalin epoch
on the allegedly Shamil’s close contacts with the Ottoman
Empire and England. At the same time, he also fails to
mention the colonial nature of the tsarist rule in the
Caucasus.139 Troitsky N. A. Istoriia Rossii XIX v. Uchebnik dlia 8 klassa. Moscow:
Tsentr gumanitarnogo obrazovaniia, 2001. pp. 85–87. See also, Katsva L. A.
Istoriia Rossii s drevneishykh vremen do serediny XIX veka. Moscow: ACT,
1999. pp. 259–261.
10 Filippova T. Ideia samobytnosti Rossii v shkol’nykh uchebnikakh
istorii//Eimermaher A., Bordiugov G. (eds.). Istoriki chitaiut uchebniki
istorii. Moscow: AIRO-XX, 2002.
11 Zyrianov P. N. Istoriia Rossii. XIX – nachalo XX vv. Uchebnaia kniga
dlia 8–9 klassa srednei shkoly. Moscow: Antikva, 1999. pp. 66–68. Also
see, Buganov V. I., Zyrianov P. N. Istoriia Rossii. Konets XVII–XIX vv.
Uchebik dlia 10 klassa obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchrezhdenii. Moscow:
Prosveshchenie, 1995. pp. 158–159.
12 Volobuev O. V., Klokov V. A., Ponomarev M. V., Rogozhkin V. A. Rossiia
i mir. Uchebik dlia 10–11 klassov obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchebnykh
zavedenii. Chast’ 1. Moscow: Novyi uchebnik, 2001. pp. 341–344.
13 Zuev M. N. Istoriia Rossii. Uchebnoe posobie dlia starsheklassnikov i
postupaiushchikh v vuzy. Tome 1. Istoriia Rossii s drevnosti do kontsa XIX
v. Moscow: ONIKS, 2002. p. 442.
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A. Danilov and L. G. Kosulina’s textbooks generously devote
a whole section to the Caucasian war discussing the cruel
methods exploited by the tsarist generals for “paciﬁcation”
of the highlanders. Yet, the main cause of the war is rep-
resented as the tsarist government’s attempt to introduce
the Russian laws and customs in the Caucasus. The authors
explain the war with a reference to “a clash of two
dissimilar cultures, traditions, and ways of life.”14 To put it
otherwise, here one deals with the contemporary cultural
argument which is artiﬁcially attributed to the quite
different epoch. Its artiﬁcial and, at the same time, “useful”
nature is evident providing one recalls that not any Russian
author treats an arrival of Islam to Chechnya in the late
medieval period or a baptism of Ossetia by the Russian
clergymen in the 18th century with the reference to
a “clash of cultures,” despite of that both Islam and
Orthodox Christianity have radically transformed local
traditional cultures. In fact, the authors in question follow
the fashionable approach with its demand to replace the
Soviet traditional concept of a “struggle for independence”
with one of a “defense of cultural originality.” Likewise,
another textbook claims that, beginning from the early
medieval period, the Slavs were permanently defending
their “cultural-national originality” from the pressure of
the much stronger “Roman–German civilization.”15 In the
former days, one might ﬁnd a formula of a “defense of
independence” in this context, instead.
In order to evaluate an effect of the cultural argument in
question on the students, one has to appreciate that the
aforementioned Danilov and Kosulina’s textbooks were
published in an unusually large number of copies (132–145
thousands), whereas only three thousands copies of the
Troitsky’s textbooks have come out which makes it prac-
tically inaccessible for school educators. At the same time,
the aforementioned Sakharov and Bokhanov’s textbook
was published in a substantial number of copies (40
thousands). All this manifests a mass spread of cultural
arguments throughout educational system, which makes
up grounds for cultural racism.
An analogy between the Caucasian war and the recent
development in Chechnya is evident. Therefore, a repre-
sentation of the Caucasian war, which restores pre-revo-
lutionary negative stereotypes of the highlanders, is able to
stir up anti-Chechen attitudes among the Russian students.
At the same time, this very image of the Caucasian war
irritates North Caucasians who remember that it was14 Danilov A. A., Kosulina L. G. Istoriia Rossii. XIX vek. Uchebik dlia 8
klassa osnovnoi shkoly. Moscow: Tsentr gumanitarnogo obrazovaniia,
1998. p. 139; idem. Istoriia gosudarstva i narodov Rossii. XIX v. Uchebik
dlia 8 klassa obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchebnykh zavedenii. Moscow:
Novyi uchebnik, 2001. p. 39, 93.
15 Kuleshov S. V., Medushevsky A. N. Rossiia v sisteme mirovykh tsivi-
lizatsii. Uchebnoe posobie. Moscow: Russkii mir, 2001. p. 46.
16 For example see, Akhmadov Ya. Z. Problema prisoedineniia narodov
Checheno-Ingushetii k Rossii//Koval’chenko I. D. (ed.). Istoriia i istoriki.
Moscow: Nauka, 1995. pp. 56–57. For details see, Shnirelman V. A revolt of
social memory: the Chechens and Ingush against the Soviet historians//
IEDA Osamu, UYAMA Tomohiko (eds.). Reconstruction and interaction of
Slavic Eurasia and its neighboring worlds, pp. 273–307. Sapporo: Slavic
Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2006.intentionally imposed upon local people by the Soviet
authorities in the 1970s–1980s in order to foster the Soviet
patriotism. This was one of the reasons for anti-Russian
attitudes there since the late 1980s on.16
Indeed, the North Caucasian people still perceive the
Caucasian war as the anti-colonial national-liberation
movement.17 For them, that was a glorious period in their
own history, a basis for a pride and self-respect. Therefore,
already at the perestroika period the North Caucasian
historians began to arrange big conferences where they
manifested their irritationwith the trend in questionwhich
they treated as an attempt to legitimate chauvinist
approaches of the pre-revolutionary historiography. For
example, the textbook in the Kabardino-Balkaria history
recently published in Nal’chik informs students that “the
All-Union academic conference in history titled ‘The
national-liberation movement of the North Caucasian
peoples in the 19th century and the makhadzhirstvo issue’
has been held in Nal’chik in October 1990, which qualiﬁed
the Russian tsarist policy in this region as conquering and
colonizing, resulting in subjugation and exile of the major
part of the Adyghe people and, partly, other peoples from
their homeland.”18 Moreover, whereas, in the Soviet period,
the local historians used to emphasize that the Ingush did
not take part in the Caucasian war or even helped the
Russian military, nowadays the Ingush textbook makes all
the efforts to revise this approach. Its author represents the
Ingush Nazran’ revolt in 1858 as one of the most important
events of the Caucasian war.19 The North Caucasian intel-
lectuals are alarmed with the attempts of certain contem-
porary Russian historians and politicians to justify the
Caucasian war.20
Only the Ossetian textbook fails to cover the Caucasian
war history, although its authors discuss the punitive
actions of the Russian military at the territory of Ossetia in
1820s–early 1830s. The Ossetians intentionally isolate
themselves from the Caucasian war: for example, they did
not celebrate the 130’s anniversary of its termination in
contrast to their neighbors who have arranged mass cele-
brations in 1994.21 It is worth noting that the topic included
into the federal curriculum in History of the Fatherland
sounds as “an incorporation of the Caucasus” rather than
“the Caucasian war”22 which means that the textbook
authors, if they want to, can treat this as less important
issue and just mention it in passing without getting into
details.
The federal textbooks’ discord in respect to the coverage
of the Caucasian war makes one wonder if the same17 For example see, Akhmadov Ya., Khismagomedov E. Op. cit.
18 Bekaldiev M. D. Istoriia Kabardino-Balkarii. Uchebik dlia 8–9 klassov
obshcheobrazovatel’nykhuchebnykhzavedenii. Nal’chik: El’brus, 2003. p.130.
19 Kodzoev N. D. Istoriia Ingushskogo naroda. S drevneishikh vremen do
kontsa XIX veka. Uchebnoe posobie dlia 7–9 klassov obshcheo-
brazovatel’nykh shkol. Magas: Serdalo, 2002. pp. 162–165.
20 Forexample see,K. Pravdivoi otsenke//Nart (Nal’chik), April 1994 (no. 4).
21 Gatagova L. Chemu my uchim//Rodina, 2000, no. 1–2. p. 204.
22 Obrazovatel’nyi standart osnovnogo obshchego obrazovaniia po
istorii. In: Federal’nyi component gosudarstvennogo obshchego standarta
po istorii. Moscow: Ministerstvo obrazovaniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2004.
pp. 131–140.
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deportation of certain North Caucasian peoples in 1943–
1944 which proved to be the most dreadful historical event
of the 20th century for them. The Danilov and Kosulina’s
textbooks inform students of illegitimate and unjust
deportation as well as of the restoration of the formerly
dissolved autonomies in 1957.23 At the same time the text-
book “Russia and the world” mentions the deportation only
in passing and only in the section which focuses on the
perestroika issues.24 The topic attracts attention of the
popular L. N. Zharova and I. A. Mishina’s textbook, yet
a short discussion includes an ambiguous formula: “The
majority of the deported peoples were punished for
collaboration with the fascists, both real and assumed.”25
Although the authors treat the deportation as the “viola-
tion of the people’s elementary rights,” their formula might
make an impression that certain ethnic groups in fact
collaborated with the Nazis all together without any
exception as they have been accused of by the Stalin’s
regime. Recently, a similar formula was used in the new
university textbook in the Russian history of 1917–2004. Its
authors claimed that certain peoples were exiled because of
their “great willingness to collaborate with the occupants or
a suspicion [of them] in that.”26 In this case, the students
also might believe that certain ethnic groups were eager to
collaborate with the Germans all without exception.
The authors of one of the most popular textbooks in
History of the Fatherland in the 20th century go even
further. They argue that in the Northern Caucasus in 1943–
1944 “armed groups accounting up to about 20 thousands
people,27 who acted in coordination with the German mili-
tary authorities, have been eliminated. To destroy this
movement the measures have been taken for a forced
resettlement of the Chechens and Ingush to Kazakhstan and
Kirgizia.”28 Yet, the textbook fails tomention the illegitimacy23 Danilov A. A., Kosulina L. G. Istoriia gosudarstva i narodov Rossii. XX v.
Uchebik dlia 9 klassa obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchebnykh zavedenii.
Moscow: Drofa, 2002. pp. 278–279, 318; Danilov A. A., Kosulina L. G.,
Pyzhikov A. V. Istoriia Rossii XX – nachala XXI veka. Uchebik dlia 9 klassa.
Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 2002. pp. 259–260, 293. Some other textbooks
also treat deportation as unjust and inhuman. For example see, Zuev M.
N. Op. cit. pp. 347–348; Dmitrenko V. P., Yesakov V. D., Shestakov V. A.
Istoriia Otechestva. XX vek. 11 klass. Posobie dlia obshcheo-
brazovatel’nykh uchebnykh zavedenii. Moscow: Drofa, 1999. pp. 335–
337; Volobuev O. V., Zhuravlev V. V., Nenarokov A. P., Stepanishchev A. T.
Istoriia Rossii. XX v. Uchebik dlia 9 klassa obshcheobrazovatel’nykh
uchebnykh zavedenii. Moscow: Drofa, 2001. pp. 214–215.
24 Volobuev O. V. et al. Rossiia i mir. Uchebik dlia 11 klassa obshcheo-
brazovatel’nykh uchebnykh zavedenii. Chast’ 2. Moscow: Novyi uchebnik,
2002. p. 260.
25 Zharova L. N., Mishina I. A. Istoriia Otechestva. XX vek. Uchebik dlia 9
klassa. Moscow: Tsentr gumanitarnogo obrazovaniia, 2002. p. 338, 353.
26 Barsenkov A. S., Vdovin A. I. Istoriia Rossii, 1917–2004. Moscow:
Aspekt Press, 2006. p. 366.
27 In fact this number was mentioned by the NKVD agents in respect to
the murids who generally collaborated with the Soviet authorities. See,
Akhmadov Ya., Khismagomadov E. Op. cit. pp. 803–804.
28 Zagladin N. V., Minakov C. T., Kozlenko S. I., Petrov Yu. A. Istoriia
Otechestva. XX c. Uchebik dlia 9 klassa obshcheobrazovatel’nykh
uchebnykh zavedenii. Moscow: Russkoe slovo, 2002. p. 233. Also see,
Zagladin N. V. Istoriia Rossii i mira v XX veke. Uchebik dlia 11 klassa
obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchrezhdenii. Moscow: Russkoe slovo, 2002. p.
283.of forced actions against the “punished peoples” as well as
the dissolution and, later, restoration of their territorial
autonomies. At the same time, the aforementioned quota-
tion in fact justiﬁes their deportationwhile representing it as
an unavoidable measure for elimination of the anti-Soviet
brigands. In fact, no more than several hundreds rebels took
part in the Chechen revolt, and their movement has been
destroyed already in fall 1942.29 No anxiety of state security
justiﬁed the Chechen and Ingush exile.30
It is worth noting that the textbook with all those
questionable arguments has won the competition among
textbooks in History of Fatherland in the 20th century
intended for public schools of the Russian Federationwhich
has been arranged by the RF Ministry of Education in 2002.
The textbook was published in a large number of copies (30
thousands against 3 thousands of Zharova and Mishina’s
textbook) and was extensively used in school education.
Together with the aforementioned Sakharov and Bokha-
nov’s textbook it developed an image of the Chechen
enemy and did foster Chechenophobia.
Whereas the Soviet authors argued that the North
Caucasian highlanders voluntarily joined Russia, nowadays
the North Caucasian scholars and intellectuals revised this
approach. They claim that oaths of loyalty towards Russia
were made by highlanders for their own current political
beneﬁts and by no means were treated by them as any
voluntary subjugation to the Russian authorities. The situ-
ation having been changed the highlanders used to forget
their own oaths, and might make them once again later.31
Even in Kabardino-Balkaria they have put into question
the, so-called, Kabardian voluntary joining with the Mos-
cow state in 1557, despite the well-known celebration of
the 400th anniversary of the event having been arranged in
1957. For the last time, an argument of the voluntary
joining was included into the Adygeian textbook in 1993
when they still used to emphasize the progressive role of
this event.32 Yet, beginning from 1994, both the Adygeian
and Kabardino-Balkarian textbooks interpret the latter as29 Loginov V. (ed.). Kavkazskie orly. Moscow: Mistikos, 1993. pp. 9–11;
Bugai N. F., Gonov A. M. (ed.) “Po resheniiu pravitel’stva Soiuza SSSR .”
Nal’chik: El’-Fa, 2003. pp. 452–455; Akhmadov Ya., Khismagomedov E.
Op. cit. pp. 814–815, 820–824. The NKVD employee intentionally
provided much higher numbers of the rebels, and it is only those
numbers together with a distorted pattern of the current events were
represented in the Soviet historic literature with a support of the Party
bosses. For that see, Katysheva M., Oziev M. Soznavat’ meru otvetstven-
nosti//Golos Checheno-Ingushetii, November 14 1990; Akaev V. Kh. Sta-
linsko-berievskaia deportatsiia chechentsev: fakty, ideologemy,
interpretatsii//Ubushaev V. B. (ed.). Natsional’naia politika sovetskogo
gosudarstva: repressii protiv narodov i problemy ikh vozrozhdeniia. Eli-
sta: Kalmytskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2003. pp. 7–11; Arapkhanova
L. Ya. Spetspereselentsy. Moscow: Andalus, 2004. p. 109.
30 Fil’kin V. I. Patriotizm trudiashchikhsia Checheno-Ingushskoi ASSR v
period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Grozny: Checheno-Ingushskoe
knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1989. pp. 29–33.
31 Nakhushev, V.S. Op. cit. pp. 257–258; Akhmadov Ya. Z. Istoriia
Chechni s drevneishikh vremen do kontsa 18 veka. Posobie dlia izu-
chaiushchikh istoriiu rodnogo kraia. Moscow: Mir domu tvoemu, 2001.
pp. 297–298, 332; Kodzoev N. D. Op. cit. pp. 152–153.
32 Anﬁmov N.V., Dzhimov B.M. and Yemtyl R.K. Istoriia Adygei. Maikop:
Adygeiskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1993. pp. 75–76.
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union.”33 For example, the contemporary Kabardino-Bal-
karian textbook claims that Kabarda has been absorbed by
Russia forcedly – formally according to the Küçük Kaynarca
peaceful treaty of 1774, but in fact as a result of the
Caucasian war.34 Only the Ossetian textbook keeps loyalty
to the Soviet historiography and argues that Ossetia has
joint Russia voluntarily. Yet even its authors, despite their
own reasoning, included a formula of the “military-political
subjugation of Ossetia.”35
It is also worth discussing how the early history of the
Cossack community in the Northern Caucasus is presented
by the federal textbook, on the one hand, and the regional
North Caucasian textbooks, on the other. The federal
Sakharov and Bokhanov’s textbook views the Cossack
arrival to the region as a peaceful colonization, which by no
means disturbed the local life.36
By contrast, the recent Chechen textbook radically
revises the Soviet dogma which maintained that the
Cossackswere the descendants of the Russianpeasantswho
ran away from their masters in search for freedom. The
textbook’s author argues that, ﬁrst, the earliest Cossacks
were the Tatars and North Caucasians who served for the
rulers of the East European medieval states, and second, an
arrival of the Russian “free” Cossacks was initiated by Mos-
cow in its aspiration to use them for seizure of the southern
territories which were claimed by the Ottoman Empire and
Iran as well. Yet, being in service of the tsarist state, the
Cossacks were by no means permanent inhabitants of the
Northern Caucasus. Until the mid-17th century there were
no more than 300–500 of them, and they had no families.
That is why it is senseless to talk of their territorial coloni-
zation.Moreover, the Greben’ Cossacks perished entirely for
several times, and to continue their mission the authorities
had to resettle newCossack groups fromDon andVolga. The
author also argues that the Greben’ Cossacks settled only at
the left bank of the Terek river. He argues that the Chechens
have lost those lands in the 1770s–1780s at the earliest after
the Russians had constructed a system of fortiﬁcation
between Mozdok and Chervlennaia village (stanitsa). In his
view, thiswas themain causeof thewarwhich theChechens
have initiated to return back their traditional territories.37
At the same time, the author demonstrates the richness
of the Cossack–Highlanders relationships which were not33 Kerashev A. T. and Chirg A. Yu. Op. cit. p. 94; Kumykov T. K. and
Miziev I. M. (eds) Istoriia Kabardino-Balkarii. Uchebnoe posobie dlia
srednei shkoly. Nal’chik: El’brus, 1995. p. 89; Bekaldiev M. D. Op. cit. p. 73.
The Kabardian historian V. N. Sokurov was probably the ﬁrst who sug-
gested this new interpretation of Kabarda joining with Russia already in
1989. See, Sokurov V. N. Bylo li prisoedinenie Kabardy k Rossii v 1557 g.
//Koval’chenko I. D. (ed.). Istoriia i istoriki. Moscow: Nauka, 1995. pp. 134–
137.
34 Bekaldiev M. D. Op. cit. pp. 88–89, 93–94. Also see, Bitova Ye. G.,
Borov A. Kh., Dzamikhov K. F., Saral’pov Z. S. Sovremennaia Kabardino-
Balkariia: problemy obshchestvennoi dinamiki, nauki i obrazovaniia.
Nal’chik: El’-Fa, 1996. p. 7.
35 Cf. Bliev, M. M. and Bzarov, R. S. Op. cit. pp. 218–220, 283.
36 Sakharov A. N., Bokhanov A. N. Istoriia Rossii. XVII–XIX veka. Uchebik
dlia 10 klassa obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchebnykh zavedenii. Moscow:
Russkoe slovo, 2003. p. 212.
37 Akhmadov Ya. Z. Istoriia Chechni. pp. 346–355.restricted by the military attacks. Indeed, they lived in the
state of symbiosis includingmutual assistance, hospitality,
symbolic friendship (kunachestvo), a special system of
child rearing and fostering (atalychestvo). To adapt
themselves to local environment the Cossacks borrowed
various elements of the highlanders’ culture: clothes,
arms, building technique. They married local women and
spoke highlanders’ languages.38 The contemporary North
Caucasian authors emphasize that sometimes highlanders
themselves joined the Terek and Greben ‘Cossacks’
communities.392. The Ossetian–Ingush conﬂict
Sometimes the contemporary regional textbooks
represent ethnic neighbors as very dangerous enemies who
used to encroach upon we-group lands for centuries. This
approach seems especially dangerous if it combines with
the contemporary ethnoterritorial or ethnopolitical
conﬂict. In March 1993 the Supreme Soviet of Northern
Ossetia (SSNO) passed a resolution on the “impossibility of
joint settlement” of the Ossetians and Ingush. This resolu-
tion, evidently racist in spirit, was initiated by the Chair of
the SSNO, Aksarbek Galazov, who referred to public
opinion.40 He also legitimated the formula of the “Ingush
aggression” against the peaceful Ossetians.41 This approach
was based on the Mark Bliev’s “academic” concept which
treated the “plundering raid system,” treachery and cruelty
as the Ingush “ethnogenetic” features closely linked with
“certain [social class] formation stage.” Bliev was devel-
oping this concept since 1983when he declared for the ﬁrst
time that aggressiveness was a function of the formational
status of the free highlanders’ communities as if, until
recently, they were at the tribal stage of development.42
While discussing the Ossetian–Ingush territorial dispute,
he maintained that one dealt with the “getting back of
a small part of the historical territory (North Caucasian
lowlands) lost by the 15th century, which might help the
Ossetians to balance their demographic processes and to
open new perspectives for economic progress.” In his
arguments he did not fail to use the term “living space”
(Lebensraum) which, in his view, the Ossetians had to
secure in order to avoid degradation and disappearance. He
went so far as to insist that this task had to make up a core
of the Ossetian “state ideology.”4338 Ibid. pp. 372–379. Also see, Barrett, Thomas M. At the edge of empire:
the Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus frontier, 1700–1860. Boulder,
Co.: Westview, 1999.
39 Akhmadov Ya. Z. Istoriia Chechni. p. 351; Bekaldiev M. D. Op. cit. p.
154.
40 Prigorodny raion: vybor tseli. Vladikavkaz: Iriston, 1997. S. 25. Only
on April 4, 1997 the Parliament of the Republic of Northern Ossetia-Alania
rejected this formula. See ibid. p. 28, 156.
41 Tishkov V. A. Ethnicity, nationalism and conﬂict in and after the
Soviet Union. London: Sage, 1997. p. 180.
42 Bliev M. M. Kavkazskaia voina: sotsial’nye istoki, sushchnost//Istoriia
SSSR, 1983, no. 2; idem. Osetiia, Kavkaz: istoriia i sovremennost’. Vladi-
kavkaz: SOGU, 1999. For criticism see, Shnirelman V. Byt’ alanami:
intellektualy i politika na Severnom Kavkaze v 20 veke. Moscow: NLO,
2006. pp. 161–168.
43 Bliev M. M. Osetiia, Kavkaz . p. 322.
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nized in Northern Ossetia as Bliev’s outstanding contribu-
tion to the study of conﬂicts and a basic approach to
understanding of many ethnic conﬂicts in Russia.44 After
Bliev, a notion of the “superﬂuous Chechen [and Ingush. V.
Sh.] passionarity45 with their relic mentality which
conserved consciousness of the ‘military democracy’
epoch”46 became popular among the Ossetian intellectuals.
In his popular article on the Ossetian–Ingush conﬂict Bliev
argued that “before recently a contemporary Ingush taip
had all the traits of the classic Iroquois clan. and current
processes in Ingushetia might be explained to the major
extent with reference to that.” He believed that the conﬂict
has been caused by the “Ingush society’s belonging to the
particular evolutionary stage” as if it was still ruled by the
laws of “military democracy” and, hence, had to manifest
“extraordinary aggression.” To conﬁrm this view he
referred to the Ingush raids on the Cossack villages (sta-
nitsy) in the very late 19th–very early 20th centuries and
failed to note that the Cossacks forcefully occupied terri-
tories which were previously inhabited by the Ingush.With
all those arguments at hand, he aspired to demonstrate that
the bloody Ossetian–Ingush clash in fall 1992 was just
a result of the new Ingush “raid.”47
The Bliev’s close colleague and collaborator, Ruslan S.
Bzarov made an attempt to develop his concept even
further. He presented the Ingush as though they enjoyed
a very archaic social structure in the 1920s–1930s, and
concluded that “the Ingush society was unable to ﬁnd its
proper place in the Great Patriotic War” as if just this
caused the catastrophic development and, hence, depor-
tation.48 Although Bzarov did not fail to mention
a discrimination of the Ingush during the last Soviet
decades, he drew a bizarre and unfounded conclusion that
the Ossetian–Ingush conﬂict was an “objective” result of
the “sharp socio-historic controversy between the Ingush
society and those processes which determined a political
and socio-economic life of the neighboring people and
states (USSR, later – Russian Federation) in general.”49 Yet,
this speculative conclusion ignored the data of the Ossetian44 Magometov A. A. Izuchenie proshlogo i nastoiashchego v interesakh
budushchego//Khadikov Kh. Kh. (ed.). Natsional’nye otnosheniia i mezh-
natsional’nye konﬂikty. Vladikavkaz: SOGU, 1997. p. 12, 19; Bzarov R. S.
Predislovie//Bliev M. M. Osetiia, Kavkaz. pp. 5–6; Degoev V. V. Problema
Kavkazskoi voiny . p. 239.
45 A pseudo-scientiﬁc term “passionarity” was introduced by historian
Lev N. Gumilev. For details see, Frumkin K. G. Passionarnost’: k istorii
idei//Rossiia XXI, 2001, no. 3. pp. 154–178.
46 Gatagova L. S. Severny Kavkaz: metamorfozy istoricheskogo sozna-
niia//Eimermaher A., Bordiugov G. (eds.). Natsional’nye istorii v sovet-
skom i postsovetskikh gosudarstvakh. Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1999. p. 260.
Also see, Tamarin Ia., Zemﬁrov V. Istoricheskaia spravka o g. Vladikavkaze
i Prigorodnom raione Severo-Osetinskoi SSR//V tumane nad propastiu.
Vladikavkaz: Ir, 1994. pp. 37–38; Totoev F. V. Razmyshleniia ob ingush-
skom vtorzhenii//V tumane nad propastiu. Vladikavkaz: Ir, 1994. p. 84.
47 Bliev M. M. “Voina est’ grekh i svidetel’stvo o grekhe”//Severnaia
Osetiia, April 13, 1993.
48 Bzarov R.S. Sotsial’no-istoricheskie i politicheskie istoki mezhetni-
cheskikh otnoshenii v Severnoi Osetii//Khadikov Kh. Kh. (ed.). Natsio-
nal’nye otnosheniia i mezhnatsional’nye konﬂikty. Vladikavkaz: SOGU,
1997. p. 135.
49 Ibid. p. 137.sociologists, which proved that the Ossetians and Ingush
shared the same ethnocultural values.50
Evidently, in the 1990s the Ossetian rhetoric integrated
the elements of “cultural racism”, and the conﬂict was
removed from the political ﬁeld into the ﬁeld of culture.
While being the authors of the new Ossetian textbook in
history, Bliev and Bzarov avoided to include there all the
aforementioned arguments. Yet, they did not fail to note
that already in the 18th century the North-Eastern Ossetian
territories became a target for the “armed aggression of the
Ingush tribes.”51 The term “armed aggression” is telling
here since it was often used by Galazov in his rhetoric
dealing with the Ossetian–Ingush conﬂict. The term helps
students to build a bridge between the recent bloody
clashes and the past events. This effect is even strength-
ened by the authors’ emphasis on the permanent Kabar-
dian and Ingush raids on the Ossetian villages which were
established at the plain in the beginning of the 19th
century.52 It is in this way that students are taught to
perceive the conﬂict as an endemic one strictly connected
with the allegedly inborn Ingush violent behavior. On his
side, the author of the Ingush textbook argued that the
contested right-bank territory was owned by the Ingush
from time immemorial: to be sure, they sometimes left it
being pressed by the powerful enemies, but not for long
and soon returned back.53
A struggle for territory reveals itself in a symbolic
meaning of the story of Vladikavkaz, the capital of the
contemporary Republic of Northern Ossetia. The Ossetian
textbooks of the 1990s used to emphasize that it has been
built up at the site of the Ossetian village of Dzuag, or
Dzaudzhikau. Yet, they never mentioned the Ingush in this
context.54 This view is represented in the most recent
Ossetian textbook with the only correction that one should
not confuse this village with another one, the “Ossetian–
Ingush village of Zaurovo,” located at some distance.55
Thus, the Ossetian students learn that, from the very
beginning, Vladikavkaz was associated with the Ossetian
territory. This view was continuously cultivated in North
Ossetia over the last half a century, and the Ossetian public
knew no alternatives at all. Yet, the Ingush have their own50 Dekinova T. V. Etnicheskie stereotypy v sisteme mezhnatsional’nykh
otnoshenii v polietnicheskom regione//Khadikov Kh. Kh. (ed.). Natsio-
nal’nye otnosheniia i mezhnatsional’nye konﬂikty. Vladikavkaz: SOGU,
1997. p. 204; Khadikov Kh. Kh., Dekinova T. V. K voprosu o psikholo-
gicheskom analize osetino-ingushskikh otnoshenii//Khadikov Kh. Kh.
(ed.). Natsional’nye otnosheniia i mezhnatsional’nye konﬂikty. Vladi-
kavkaz: SOGU, 1997. pp. 452–454. These data can hardly be a surprise,
because the Ossetians and Ingush lived side by side for centuries, often
married each other, and shared cultural achievements with each other.
See, Magometov A. Kh. Etnicheskiei kul’turno-istoricheskie sviazi alan-
osetin i ingushei. Ordzhonikidze: Ir, 1982.
51 Bliev M. M. and Bzarov R. S. Op. cit. p. 185, 215.
52 Ibid. p. 238, 240.
53 Kodzoev N. D. Op. cit.
54 For example see, Bzarov R. S. Rasskazy po istorii Severnoi Osetii dlia 5
klassa. Ordzhonikidze: Ir, 1990. S. 45; Bliev M. M. and Turgiev T. B. Istoriia
Severnoi Osetii. Uchebnoe posobie dlia 7–8 klassov. 4th edition. Vladi-
kavkaz: Ir, 1994. p. 47.
55 Bliev M. M. and Bzarov R. S. Op. cit. p. 227. For the Ossetian–Ingush
debates on the early history of Vladikavkaz see, Shnirelman V. A. Byt’
alanami. pp. 156–158.
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book reserves four and a half pages to this story, and refers
to numerous historic documents in order to prove that the
Russian fortress of Vladikavkaz has been founded near the
Ingush village of Zaurovo when there were no Ossetians at
all in the area.56
The Ingush and Ossetian textbooks manifest highly
different attitudes towards the Cossacks. The Ingush text-
book demonstrates even more radical view of them than
the Chechen one does. The Ingush author is not interested
in the Cossack origins at all. Instead, in contrast to the
Soviet historiography, he describes almost permanent state
of war between the Cossacks and highlanders which has
begun in 1562 when, according to the author, the joint
Kabardian-Cossack army devastated 164 Ingush dwelling
sites, and the Kabardians settled temporarily at the Ingush
territory.57 He also does not fail to mention that, in the 19th
century, the Cossacks occupied lands which were forcefully
cleansed of the Ingush.58 In contrast, the Ossetian textbook
fails to discuss the Terek Cossack issue including a history of
their settlement between the Terek and Sunja rivers.
Indeed, the Ossetians treat those lands as their own terri-
tories, but they do notwant to quarrel with the Cossacks for
political reasons.
The Ossetian–Ingush conﬂict has one more dimension
which is a symbolic representation of their remote ances-
tors. Following the Ossetian historiography, the Ossetian
textbooks indiscriminately identify the Ossetian ancestors
with the early medieval Alans. In this context, the Alans are
represented as a well-bounded homogenous Iranian-
speaking group. Yet, the issue is rather controversial, and
some scholars believe that the Alan tribal conglomeratewas
heterogeneous in culture and language, especially in the
later periods when it has probably integrated some non-
Iranian groups. It is for this reason that the neighbors of the
Ossetians are also able to claim the Alans as their own
ancestors the more so that the Alan heritage includes
a highly desired territory.59 The Ossetians emphatically
reject all such claims. That is why, while discussing the
economic, cultural and marital relationships between the
Ossetians and Ingush in the past, the Ossetian textbook
authors fail to cover the issue of the Ingush origins.60
The Ingush textbook author uses a different strategy,
and the Ossetians enjoy no place in his work at all. He does
not recognize any association of the Alans with the Iranian
language and culture: “In fact, historic Alans had nothing to
do with the Iranians,” “an ethnic name of the Alans was
used for the Old Ingush Koban’ tribes since the beginning of56 Kodzoev N. D. Op. cit. pp. 154–158. One can ﬁnd the same arguments
in the Chechen textbook. See, Akhmadov Ya. Z. Istoriia Chechni. p. 370.
57 Kodzoev N. D. Op. cit. p. 135.
58 Ibid. pp. 169–171.
59 Shnirelman V. A. Bor’ba za alanskoe nasledie//Vostok, 1996, no. 5;
idem. Byt’ alanami.; idem. Inventing the Alans: origins of the peoples,
and politics in the Northern Caucasus//Keiko Sakai (ed.). Social protests
and nation-building in the Middle East and Central Asia. Chiba: Institute
of Developing Economics (IDE), JETRO, 2003; idem. The Politics of
a Name: between consolidation and separation in the Northern Cauca-
sus//Acta Slavica Iaponica, 2006, t. 23. pp. 37–73.
60 Bliev M. M. and Bzarov R. S. Op. cit. p. 143.the common era.”61 Respectively, he reads the famous
Iranian-language Zelenchuk inscription. in Ingush.62 Yet,
the Ingush textbook author does not want to skip the
Ossetian image entirely. This ﬁnds an extravagant mani-
festation in his view of the Indo-European origins
(evidently, he means the Ossetian claims for the “Aryan
heritage”): “The remote ancestors of the Indo-European
peoples who participated in the Nostratic family of
languages and enjoyed the Mongolian physical type,
migrated from Central Asia to Europe in the 5th Mill. B.C.
and adopted the Caucasian (European) physical type of the
native Sino-Caucasian inhabitants of Europe.”63 It is
evident that in this context, ﬁrst, the remote Ossetian
ancestors are provided with the less prestigious Mongolian
appearance, and second, the Ossetians should acknowledge
the North Caucasians’ generosity due to which they have
been provided not only with the higher culture but even
with the physical appearance.3. School as a ﬁeld of the “clash of civilizations”
As L. S. Gatagova has already emphasized, a sharp differ-
ence has emerged between the metropolitan and North
Caucasian (but for the Ossetian) scholars in the 1990s. In her
view,whereas the former focuson the civilizational (cultural)
mission of the Empire, the latter continue to emphasize its
expansion and colonial policy.64 One can view this contro-
versy in another prospect as well – as a struggle for identity:
civilizational one (“Russian civilization”) at the federal level
and ethnic (ethnopolitical) one with respect to the titled
peoples at the regional level.65 Nowadays, this is not
restricted by the narrow circle of specialists, but encom-
passes a large number of students who are indoctrinated
withquite opposite representationsof thekeyhistoric events
orhistoric actors. Besides, ethnocentric viewsembedded into
the educational materials manifest a competition between
neighboring peoples either for real (territory, political status,
social domination) beneﬁts or for symbolic (ancestors’ glory,
prestige cultural achievements) values.66
As it was mentioned above, a diversity of the federal
textbooks in history does not allow to generalize too much.
Yet, after, in the late 1990s, the Ministry of Education began
to introduce the civilizational approach, a tendency
emerged in the federal textbooks to represent the ethnic
Russians (“russkii narod”) as the main, if not the only, actor
at the historical scene, and as the “state-forming people”61 Kodzoev N. D. Op. cit. p. 96.
62 Ibid. pp. 98–99.
63 Ibid. p. 10.
64 Gatagova L. Chemu my uchim. p. 203. Also see, idem. Imperiia:
identiﬁkatsiia problemy//Vestnik institute tsivilizatsii. Vladikavkaz, 1998.
Vyp. 1. p. 176.
65 Shnirelman V. A. Mezhdu yevraziotsentrizmom i etnotsentrizmom: o
novom istoricheskom obrazovanii v Rossii//Vestnic Instituta Kennana v
Rossii, 2003, vyp. 4. For a struggle for civilizational identity in contem-
porary Russia see, Shnirelman V. A. Tsivilizatsionnyi podkhod kak nat-
sional’naia ideia//V. A. Tishkov, V. A. Shnirelman (eds.). Natsionalizm v
mirovoi istorii. Moscow: Nauka, 2007. pp. 36–59.
66 Shnirelman V. A. The myths of descent: the views of the remote past,
and school textbooks in contemporary Russia//Public Archaeology, 2003,
vol. 3, no. 1. pp. 33–51.
V.A. Shnirelman / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 125–133 133(“gosudarstvoobrazuiushchii narod”). In this context, the
Russian people (i.e. ethnic Russians) are represented as but
the only builders of both the state and culture, and the
Russian civic identity (“rossiiskaia”) proves to be the
Russian ethnic one (“russkaia”). The other peoples’ contri-
bution into political development and culture is mostly
ignored, or those peoples are treated in a paternalistic way.
With all this in mind, it seems no accident that, during the
last ﬁve-six years, an image of enemy in mass media is
represented in a more general form – whereas before
recently it was associated with certain particular ethnic
groups (Chechens, Azeris, Jews, and the like), nowadays it
refers to “non-Russians” in general.67 One reveals the same
pattern in school.68 Moreover, whereas, in the early 1990s,
a level of xenophobia among the youngsters was much
lower than among the other age-sets, ten years later this
difference has disappeared.69
Appeals to “culturecentrism” and to development of
“national idea”which weremade by various politicians and
educationists in the 1990s, made many federal textbooks’
authors to base their concepts on the idea of ethnocultural
or civilizational identity. In this context, culture is repre-
sented as an essential totality, closed system with well-
deﬁned borders which are established by the concepts of
“originality” and “ecology of culture” rather than an image
of culture or symbolic code. This view ignores bicultur-
alism, complex and continuous cultural intercommunica-
tions and interrelations, cultural dynamics and intensive
innovative activity, interpretation and reinterpretation of
culture. Indeed, cultures might be imagined as liquids
which mixture forms a qualitatively new substance rather
than as wooden cubes that maintain their qualities what-
ever constructions are built of them. It is for this reason that
a concept of “cultural hybridity” became popular in the
Western scholarship nowadays.70
A mythological image of a well-bounded objectivated
culture which is popular in contemporary Russia endangers
a society with losses and failures. Firstly, it stimulates an
aspiration foranartiﬁcial self-isolation fromtheoutsideworld
which looksUtopia in the ageof globalization. Secondly,while
shifting people’s attitude to the past rather than future it
conserves traditionalism and fosters victimization which
hampers further development. Thirdly, it promotes a belief in
a hierarchyof local cultures (“civilizations”) and, thus, justiﬁes
discrimination. Finally, while providing certain cultural
elements or culture in general with extraordinary perma-
nency and stability this approach ascribes evil behavior to
certain ethnic groups as if it was an inborn trait of their67 Kozhevnikova G. Yazyk vrazhdy cherez god posle Beslana//Bashinova
Yu., Taubina N. (eds.). Monitoring diskriminatsii i national-extremizma v
Rossii. Moscow: Fond “Za grazhdanskoe obshchestvo”, 2006. pp. 41–45.
68 Rusakova Ye. Faktory xenofobii shkol’nikov i vybor pedagogicheskikh
strategii. A paper delivered at the International conference “Racial
discourse in the Russian education”, St.-Petersburg, April 10–11, 2004.
69 Pain E. A. Pochemu pomolodela xenophobia//Nezavisimaia gazeta,
October 14, 2003.
70 For a contemporary approach to “culture” see, for example, Werbner
P., Modood T. (eds.). Debating cultural hybridity. Multi-cultural identities
and the politics of anti-racism. London: Zed Books, 1997; Avruch K.
Culture and conﬂict resolution. Washington, D. C.: United States Institute
of Peace, 1998. pp. 12–21.“original” culture.71 Hence, certain textbook authors borrow
uncritically some questionable reasoning of the American
political scientist Samuel Huntington and, with reference to
him, argue that it is “cultural differences [which] cause
contradictions between civilizations.”72 Yet, the group
conﬂicts which refer to core ethnocultural values prove to be
almost insoluble.73 That is why it is very dangerous to use
cultural arguments in political rhetoric and to indoctrinate
people with them through school and mass media.
Indeed, it is those arguments which are appreciated and
extensively exploited by contemporary xenophobia which
turns into cultural racism. For example, those moods make
up a basis for the anti-Semitic Khazar myth74 and, as we
know, nowadays they cultivate soil for anti-Caucasian
phobia. Indeed, some popular textbooks depict certain
North Caucasian ethnic groups as if they are inborn plun-
ders, bandits and traitors. This approach is based on the
biased representation of the key points of the North
Caucasian history: the Caucasian war of the early 19th
century and the deportation of 1943–1944.
By contrast, the North Caucasian textbooks (but the Osse-
tian one), on the one hand, treat the Caucasian war as the
glorious period of regional history, and on the other, demonize
the tsarist generals. Besides, sometimes they blame the
Cossacks as well. At the same time, whereas, as we know, the
federal textbooks demonstrate fascination with the cultur-
ecentric (civilizational) agenda, the regional ones still focus on
the social class approach. A shift from the “voluntary joining”
concept tothe “forcefulabsorption”whichtookplace incertain
republics in the early 1990swas a response to current political
demands – a struggle of ethnic autonomies for upgrading of
their political status. Their elites believed that both victimiza-
tionandancestors’glorymighthelp toachieve thatend. That is
whytheykeptaccusing the tsarist authorities for theCaucasian
war, and the Stalin regime– for thedeportation. This approach
proves to reﬂect a speciﬁc nature of relationships between
republics and federal center. While emphasizing the political
issues, they do not infuse students with negative stereotypes
which might necessarily stir up Russophobia.
At the same time, the Republican textbooks reﬂect various
ethnic tensions including those ones which are caused by
a struggle for contested territories. For example, the Ossetian
textbookdepicts thePrigorodnydistrictas theancientOssetian
land, whereas the Ingush one treats it as the homeland of the
Ingush people. Both these ideas might look more convincing
with a reference to the Alan ancestors, and both sidesmake all
the efforts to privatize and to monopolize them.71 Special studies of aggressiveness and peaceful behavior revealed their
mostly social and historical background – there is no ground to believe in
any inborn traits of “group character.” For that see, Shnirelman V. A. U
istokov voiny i mira//Pershits A. I., Semenov Yu. I. and Shnirelman V. A.
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Etnologii i Antropologii RAN, 1994. pp. 20–24.
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1861–2001. Moscow: Vuzovskaia kniga, 2003. p. 8.
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